The Opportunistic Approach to Monetary Policy is an influential but untested model of optimal monetary policy. We provide the first tests of the model, using US data from 1983Q1-2004Q1.
Introduction
Empirical models of monetary policy are widely used to study interest rates and to investigate the objectives of policymakers. The great majority of studies use the Taylor rule (Taylor, 1993) . This is a simple linear relationship in which desired real interest rates adjust in each period to eliminate a fixed proportion of the gap between actual and desired values of inflation and output.
Recently, however, there has been increasing dissatisfaction with the Taylor rule.
In part, this is due to concerns about whether Taylor rules are optimal, as some authors argue that policymakers can do better by following alternative rules (e.g. Svensson, 2003) .
But there are also concerns that the Taylor rule is too restrictive, suggesting that a more sophisticated approach to the empirical modeling of monetary policy may provide new insights. Given the importance of models of monetary policy to the academic and wider policy communities, evaluation of these alternative approaches is important.
One possible alternative is the Opportunistic Approach to Monetary Policy (Opportunistic Approach), developed by Orphanides and Wilcox (2002) and Aksoy et al (2005) . Originally prompted by comments by members of the Federal Open Market Committee, the Opportunistic Approach has two main features. The best-known feature is the argument that policymakers should take aggressive action when inflation is some way from its desired level but should otherwise give greater priority to output. This is formalized using the concept of the zone of discretion, a range of values for the inflation rate around the desired rate. It is argued that policymakers should raise real interest rates when inflation is above the zone of discretion and cut real interest rates when inflation is below the zone. When inflation is inside the zone, policymakers should behave opportunistically by accommodating shocks that tend to move inflation towards the desired level but not otherwise responding to shocks until the boundaries of the zone of discretion are reached. A second feature of the approach is the argument that policymakers should attempt to move inflation towards an intermediate inflation target that reflects both the desired inflation rate (or inflation target) and the inflation rate inherited from the previous period.
This approach implies a more subtle response to macroeconomic events than with the linear Taylor rule. Policymakers respond aggressively when inflation threatens to move some way from the desired level but respond more passively when inflation only deviates from the desired level by a smaller amount. Arguably, the Opportunistic Approach also has similarities with "constrained discretion" as advocated by Bernanke and Mishkin (1997) and Bernanke (2003) 1 . Thus far, the literature has viewed the Opportunistic Approach as a recommendation for how policymakers ought to behave rather than as a description of how policymakers have actually behaved in practice.
This paper, by contrast, will examine whether policymakers' behavior has been consistent with the Opportunistic Approach.
We begin by testing whether policymakers have been using an intermediate inflation target. Doing this requires only a slight extension of the familiar Taylor rule model of monetary policy. We then assess the prediction that policymakers respond more aggressively when inflation is outside the zone of discretion by considering the model of the Opportunistic Approach proposed by Aksoy et al (2005) . This requires a three-regime model in which the behavior of interest rates depends on whether inflation is expected to be within, above or below the zone of discretion. We assess the suitability of such a model by testing the previously estimated Taylor rule for the effects of neglected nonlinearity, using a test that is known to be sensitive to the type of nonlinearity implied by the Opportunistic Approach. We then present estimates of the model before considering related models that relax some of the assumptions of the model of Aksoy et al (2005) .
We estimate our models using US data for the period 1983Q1-2004Q1
and using real-time output data. We find strong empirical support for the Opportunistic Approach. Introducing an intermediate inflation target into an otherwise standard Taylor rule improves the fit of the model. The structural nonlinear model implied by the Opportunistic Approach fits the data better than a Taylor rule. In our preferred model, a slightly amended version of the model of Aksoy et al (2005) , we find that the zone of discretion is symmetric, extending from 1% below the desired inflation rate to 1% above. These estimates suggest that key features of the Opportunistic Approach are reflected in the behavior of policymakers.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 outlines the model of Orphanides and Wilcox (2002) and Aksoy et al (2005) 
where i* is the equilibrium nominal interest rate. Equation (4) Finally, we note that although these models assume interest rates respond to the current values of inflation and the output gap, it would not be difficult to amend the assumptions of the model to produce forward-looking versions of the behavioral relationships in (4)- (6).
Testing the Opportunistic Approach to Monetary Policy
In this section we assess the Opportunistic Approach using US data for We begin by estimating simple linear Taylor rules. To allow for the high degree of interest rate smoothing that has been observed in previous studies, we assume (7) 1( 1 )
where î is the desired interest rate, given by (8)
Combining (7) and (8) and invoking rational expectations, our empirical model is
where ε is an error term composed of the various expectational errors in (9).
The restrictions embodied in (9) allow us to estimate the Taylor rule using GMM.
Column (i) of Table 1 present estimates of this model. We estimate that ρ i =0.92
and that ρ π =1.76, which are similar to that found in previous estimates (e.g. Judd and Rudebusch, 1998, Clarida et al, 2000) . We estimate that ρ y =2.41 which is higher than usual 4 . Column (ii) of Table 1 (10)
Although the estimates are broadly similar (we estimate ρ i =0.89, ρ π =2.10 and ρ y =2.00), the forward-looking model fits the data better. However both models fail a parameter stability test.
We next estimate models that use the intermediate inflation target in place of the inflation target. To do this, we model the desired interest rate using (11) Taylor rule to give an empirical counterpart to (5). We absorb the inflation target into the constant and do not seek to identify this at this stage. Column (iii) of Table 1 presents estimates of this model (where we use n=4), while column (iv)
of Table 1 presents estimates of a forward-looking version of this model, given by (13)
We note that both versions of the model produce broadly similar estimates but that the forward-looking model is again superior. In column (iv) we estimate that μ=0.59 and find that the null hypothesis H 0 : μ=0 is clearly rejected by the data.
Comparing estimates in columns (iii) and (iv) with estimates in columns (i) and The second aspect of the Opportunistic Approach in which the behavior of policymakers differs according to whether inflation is expected to lie within the zone of discretion, implies that the models in Table 1 are misspecified, since they ignore the implied regime switching behavior of policymakers. We therefore test the estimated models in Table 1 for the presence of non-linearities. The last three rows of Table 1 report Hamilton's (2001) λ-test, and the λ A and g-tests proposed
by Dahl and González-Rivera (2003) . Under the null hypothesis of linearity, these are Lagrange multiplier test statistics following the χ 2 distribution (a brief description of these tests is given in the Appendix of the paper) 5 . These tests are powerful in detecting non-linear smooth transition behavior (Dahl and González-Rivera, 2003) . This is of particular interest as we shall use smooth transition specifications below. All three tests reject linearity.
Having rejected linearity, we next consider the model (14)
This is the model of Orphanides and Wilcox (2002) in (4) Table 1 . This suggests that a forward-looking version of this model might be preferable. Column (ii) of Table 2 presents estimates of such a model, given by (15) 
This model has a lower standard error than the models in Table 1 and has a lower response to inflation outside the zone of discretion.
Refinements and Robustness of the Opportunistic Approach
The estimates in the previous section suggest that the Opportunistic Approach to monetary policy has empirical support, especially when modified to allow for a forward-looking response to inflation. In this section we consider refinements of this approach, investigating whether the empirical fit of the model can be improved. Our first refinement allows a smoother transition between regimes.
We consider the model (16) 
Equation (16) differs from (15) in that the regimes are weighted by the probability of being in each regime. Equation (16) In (17a) and (17b), the smoothness parameter γ > 0 determines the smoothness of the transition regimes. We follow Granger and Teräsvirta (1993) and Teräsvirta (1994) in making γ dimension-free by dividing it by the standard deviation of
Preliminary estimates again found no response to inflation within the zone of discretion and that setting ρ ZD =0 improved the efficiency of the estimates; this restriction is imposed in the estimates of the model reported in column (iii) of As before, preliminary estimates found no response to inflation within the zone of discretion and we again imposed ρ ZD =0, to improve the efficiency of our estimates, which are reported in column (iv) of (18) and express the probability of being in the zone of discretion as (20) 
Robustness analysis
We investigated the robustness of our results by assuming n=1 in equation (12) Table 2 although with a much smaller response to the output gap when final output data are used; the output response is insignificant when the CBO measure of potential output is used 8 .
These alternative estimates provide empirical support for the Opportunistic Approach and confirm our finding that zone of discretion is symmetric.
The Hodrick-Prescott filter is a two-sided symmetric filter in the sense that it uses data on past and future output symmetrically to decompose each output observation. The HP filter is optimal (in the expected squared error sense) for the midpoint of the output series but not for the endpoints of the series where it changes in γ have a small impact on the shape of the functions (17a), (17b), (19) and (20), which implies that the γ estimate does not need be precise (van Dijk et al, 2002) .
becomes increasingly one-sided; this affects the efficiency properties of the filter.
To correct this, Mise et al (2005a,b) suggest the construction of the output gap by applying the Hodrick-Prescot filter to a forecast-augmented output series. Garratt et al (2005) generate these forecasts using (i) a univariate model of the real-time output and (ii) a bivariate vector autoregression which estimates jointly real-time output data and its revisions. Garratt et al (2005) argue that the joint modeling of real-time output and its revisions avoids the problem of overstating the revision effects in the published output data if these revision effects have been anticipated. Columns (v) and (vi) of Table 3 present estimates using these alternative measures of the Hodrick-Prescott output series. These estimates are very similar to those of our preferred model in column (iv) of Table 2 , so allowing for possible weaknesses in our measure of the output gap makes little difference to our estimates.
Implications of the Opportunistic Approach
The Opportunistic Approach provides a richer account of monetary policy than the familiar Taylor rule. In particular, the response to inflation varies over time, in contrast to the constant response implied by the Taylor rule. Although the average response to inflation across our sample is 1.89, which, as we would expect, is similar to the estimates of the Taylor rules in columns (i) to (iv) of Table   1 , the response to inflation implied by the Taylor rule is highly misleading. In practice, interest rates were either far more responsive to inflation or else did not respond at all. inflation rate. This is calculated (using the estimates in column (iv) of Table 2) as: 
Conclusions
The Opportunistic Approach to Monetary Policy is an influential but untested model of optimal monetary policy. We provide the first tests of the model, using US data from 1983Q1-2004Q1.
Our results support the Opportunistic Approach. We find that policymakers respond to the gap between inflation and an intermediate target that reflects the recent history of inflation. We find that there is no response of interest rates to inflation when inflation is within 1% of the intermediate target but
a strong response when inflation is further from the intermediate target.
These estimates are only a first attempt to test the Opportunistic Approach. But they do show that behavior of policymakers is more subtle and complex than assumed in the familiar Taylor rule. Further research around these issues may well prove fruitful.
Appendix: Non-linearity tests
Hamilton's (2001) Lagrange multiplier test statistics following the χ 2 distribution (for more technical details see Hamilton, 2001, and Dahl and González-Rivera, 2003 (Hansen, 1982) . The instruments are a constant and six lags of the variables in the estimated rule. Parameter stability is an F test of parameter stability (see Lin and Teräsvirta, 1994, and Eitrheim and Teräsvirta, 1996) . The table also reports bootstrapped p-values of the λ, λ A , and g tests based on 1000 re-samples. (Hansen, 1982) . The instruments are a constant and six lags of the variables in the estimated rule. Parameter stability is an F test of parameter stability (see Lin and Teräsvirta, 1994, and Eitrheim and Teräsvirta, 1996) . Note: The figure plots the deviation of interest rates from equilibrium due to the inflation gap implied by the estimates in column (iv) of Table 1 and column (iv) of 
